186, 728, 648, 668

Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Succession States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87./

175, 648, 177, 186

Lebanon ME1

[For a survey of the political history of Lebanon before and during the French mandate, and information on westernization, sectarianism, and nationalism in Lebanon, see Il: Hourani, MD1 Syria, category 116, entire source.]

7: Gulick E-5 (1952) 1955 ME1 Lebanon ME1

remembered that genealogically and conceptually (the villagers' concept), Mouqîl is a single kinship unit.[1]

This structure of in-groups is traditional, and it appears to have maintained its vitality in the face of great culture change, to which a limited amount of local exogamy seems to be the only major concession. When, however, we turn to the other areas of behavior which are reviewed in this chapter, we find that none of them can be discussed at all without reference to the problems of acculturation.

MONEY

The villagers' need for, and great concern about, money is very clear indeed. This is entirely understandable since the expense of education and manufactured products, alone, require much of it.

Money as it is known in the Western world is very ancient in the Middle East, in fact it apparently originated there; however, before about seventy-five years ago its use in most villages was limited, since for most needs barter and mutual help in a regime of local self-sufficiency were ordinarily enough to motivate exchange of goods and services.

Money began to come in large quantities into villages like Mouqîl from emigrants in America. At the same time, Lebanon began to receive foreign manufactured articles which could only be obtained through payment of cash. Today, money is the only means of exchange in the village, and prices are an incessant topic of conversation among the villagers. This is, of course, due in part to the fact that the country has suffered severe inflationary trends during the past ten years, in part, according to Murray, to "a moral speculative proclivity on the part of most of the people" (1947, p. 33).

However, there are some indications that this recent emphasis on money as a thing in itself has set up disturbing conflicts in many people. For example, it is often heard that the Western powers are obviously bent upon buying the friendship of the Arabs, but that true friends cannot be bought. Such an attitude might either be a projection of attitudes or behavior prevalent among the speakers themselves, or it might be an expression of sincere and objective distaste for one of the unpleasant consequences of overemphasis on money. In any case, a conflict in values relating to money is consciously recognized.

EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE

"In Mouqîl you will find [illegible] people who live in poor houses but have much education. This is because we would [illegible] or, if we must choose, use our money for a fine education than for a fine house." This was one of the first remarks that was made to the writer about the culture of the village, and, as time went on,

[1] For additional perspectives on the structure of the village see Gulick (1955, pp. 170-71).

Middle East MI
7: Gulick E-5 (1952) 1955 ME1 Lebanon ME1

It is, of course, no surprise to the anthropologist to learn that acculturation in the Middle East, as elsewhere, shows that material cultural traits are more readily transmitted than non-material ones. Nor is it any surprise to him that these material traits, the automobile for example, though readily *accepted*, cannot be *assimilated* without some major social readjustments. Before the latter are completed, there is bound to be turmoil and discomfort. But the turmoil in the Middle East is greatly aggravated through education by the introduction of a motley assortment of Western ideas, ideals, and concepts which cannot be ignored yet which the average student does not have the background to evaluate. If this were not confusing enough, the Arab student has become keenly aware of the frequently extreme discrepancy between Western ideals and some Western actions.

At the village level, one effect of modern education which has been of great significance in Mosul, is summarized by Kawai, ". . . the kind of education which is being offered in the public and most of the private schools tends to draw youth away from the villages and renders them unfit for work on the farms" (1951, p. 143).

In one respect, however, as we have already intimated, modern education has not, except in extreme cases, weakened the great value which the Arabs place upon their beloved native language. The very sound of the words is a profound delight to them. This has always been true, but one suspects that in recent years their pride in it as something uniquely their own has been greatly emphasized. Here is one treasure that the Westerners, for all their material skill and wealth, do not possess, which they can never make their own, which most Westerners who are given the opportunity fail to master even as a tool, which a few Westerners do master but only after considerable effort and application. And so, to its native speakers, Arabic is more than just a semantic tool; it is a source of everyday pleasure and inspiration, and it is a symbol of cultural integrity.

Associated with this is the cultural trait of elaborate welcoming. There are courtesy verbal formulas which cover every conceivable occasion from giving condolences to asking for, giving, and receiving a drink of water. Ordinarily, one does not come directly to the point on any issue; one approaches it circuitously, not because one is necessarily evasive in personality, but because *it is the thing to do*. And *it is the thing to do* because *it is enjoyable*. One Arab has put the matter thus: "Brevity is the soul of singleness." (Khairy, 1916, p. 208.) In the present writer's opinion, not enough thought has been given to the possibility that the great difference in this respect between Arab and, particularly, American values has been responsible for a noticeable portion of the mutual irritation and misunderstanding which has occurred in recent years.

As always, as mentioned above, there is an exception to the rule. The knowledge of English is not to be interpreted as a breach in the villagers' cultural defenses, for English is learned, used, and looked upon as a tool only.

7: Gulick E-5 (1952) 1955 ME1 Lebanon ME1

who worked in the city over where they would send their children to school, back in the village or in the city.

Another young adult was completely explicit in his expression of preference for the material and mechanical conveniences of city life which are not available in the village. The scorn for manual labor on the part of Western-educated Arabs has been noted by other students, and is clearly in evidence. In Beirut, for example, Arabs of the most modest means employ a housemaid if they possibly can. This "effendi-complex" is symbolized by many men by a practice whose resemblance in both form and meaning to a proverbial Chinese one is really quite striking—the nails of the little fingers are allowed to grow conspicuously long. This practice is not followed by everyone, but it is very common.

NATIONALISM AND XENOPHOBIA

The rise of nationalism in the Middle East, especially since 1918, is a much written upon topic, full details of which cannot and need not be given here. But we are concerned with the way in which the rise of nationalism has affected the Lebanese village in general, Mansūf in particular. Tannous sums the matter up in the following words:

> Put, in the most general terms the change in the village at present is in politico-national awakening. This factor carries with it great possibilities for rural development, as well as grave dangers for the way of life. *National consciousness at present permeates rural life in Lebanon* [our italics]. At the same time, practically every village community has been actively reached by one or more of several political ideologies. *Rural people have begun to identify themselves with greater national and international entities* [our italics]. (Tannous, 1943, p. 162.)

The penetration of nationalistic sentiments into villages such as Mansūf would, of course, have been impossible without modern techniques of communication, particularly the press and radio. Rapid surface transportation also has drastically reduced the number and extent of isolated communities. And nationalism itself is a consequence of, and a reaction to, the culture contact situation. (Cf. Schreiber, 1953a, p. 31.)

As has been pointed out, the public school curriculum includes regular exhortations to the elements of patriotism, national pride and unity. Small national flags are frequently seen displayed in such unconventional places as automobiles and buses. The national emblem (a cedar tree with triangular foliage and a thick, short trunk) is often seen, in Mansūf and elsewhere, scrawled on walls. It is by no means true, however, that national loyalty has replaced local loyalties to the extent that, for example, of modern Japanese villagers (cf. Embree, 1939, p. 302). In terms of the in-group analysis in this chapter, the nation has become, for the anti-tribal villagers, the fifth in the series of in-groups which engage his feelings of loyalty and identification.

7: Gulick E-5 (1952) 1955 ME1 Lebanon ME1

Middle East nationalism is, among other things, very definitely an in-group sentiment, and it is most frequently expressed in terms of opposition to foreign powers. This opposition is not entirely unjustified, but it very often exceeds reason and becomes purely emotional hatred. There is much truth in Khoury-Ani's contention that this xenophobia is a general reaction to the many frustrations inherent in the acculturative situation, that it is, in many cases, a scapegoat mechanism (*ibid.*, pp. 37–38).

Lebanese Christians, such as the Maronites, appear to have especially painful ambivalent feelings in this matter. Much of the xenophobia at present has particular reference to the United States because of its role in the establishment of Israel. But before World War II, the United States and its citizens enjoyed a remarkably fine reputation among the Lebanese, which could not be completely erased by subsequent events. Many villagers attempt to resolve the conflict by trying to persuade themselves and each other that *all* the doings of the Americans are, in some way or other, motivated by hostility towards them. This attempted persuasion does not appear to have been entirely successful, and the process continues.

THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST

Charles Malik, the distinguished Lebanese philosopher and statesman, has recently written that the trouble with Northrop's book, *The Meeting of East and West*, is that it does not take into consideration the meeting of the two, namely the Middle East (Malik, 1955, p. 4). Malik, whose own career is an outstanding example of the acculturative process, is deeply troubled, as everyone concerned is, by the disruption which acculturation has caused in the Middle East, and he seems to feel, to put his words into anthropological terms, that mutual understanding and the reduction of tensions will only be achieved when and if the cultural premises of the West are perceived and appreciated by the East. We hope that he is not implying that these cultural premises should be *imposed* on the East, but in any case, he is correct in pointing out that Western influence has so far been disproportionately on the material side. The Arabs appreciate the practical advantages of the products of Western inventiveness, but in general they have been given little opportunity to learn that the West has anything more to offer than tools, techniques and money. Consequently, one hears frequently the bitter remark that while they, the Arabs, are a spiritual people, the Westerners are cruel materialists. Though many have been exposed to segments of Western thought in school and college, few have been able to achieve a genuine rapport with this necessarily disembodied material.

And so, the meeting of East and West in the Middle East at the present time can be viewed as a conflict of values. According to Kerner (1955, p. 177), there are a few who would resolve the conflict by having the Middle East break away completely from its own culture (which they themselves have done). This view

is as naive and visionary as its opposite—the deliberate perversion of all further acculturation and a general turning back of the cultural clock, a procedure advocated by certain groups.

For the most part, the Maronites appear to belong to a much larger group than either of the two extremes, whose approximate situation has been described as follows:

> They (the Syrians and Lebanese) are peculiarly aware of the "tension" between East and West and between Islam and Christianity. This is partly because their minds are exceptionally subtle, flexible, and sensitive; but partly also because Syria has always been exposed to influences coming in from Mediterranean lands and tends to be affected by them sooner and more profoundly than the other Arab countries. Through the mission-schools, through emigration, and in other ways, there has been built up in Syria an educated class westernized in spirit as well as in externals, but still Arabic in language and for the most part sympathetic and feelings. Thus the conflict between East and West has become a conflict inside their own souls; as such it raises problems which press themselves with peculiar urgency. (Hourani, 1946, p. 75.)

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7: Gulick E-5 (1952) 1955 ME1 Lebanon ME1

ME 621 S78 L 621 S78

the village because it provides manufactured goods, and the village supplies the city with food. Fisher concludes:

> From these three elements, closely integrated by material and cultural ties, has arisen the present complex pattern of society in the Middle East; and it is on this basis that one can postulate a unity for the region as a whole. As a tapestry or painting owes its special character to an intermingling of diverse color masses, so the Middle East can be conceived as a unity based on a number of distinctive yet related ways of life. (*Ibid.*, p. 438.)

A recent paper by Patai (1952) deals with important aspects of this same topic.

ME 186 .63 S11 L 186 S63 S11

Coon brings a functional approach to bear on the situation, to which he gives a name, the "mosaic system." His specific view is that the mosaic system is based on an ethnic division of labor:

> . . . the ideal was to emphasize not the uniformity of the citizens of a country as a whole but a uniformity within each special segment, and the greatest possible contrast between segments. The members of each ethnic unit feel the need to identify themselves by some configuration of symbols. If by virtue of their history they possess some racial peculiarity, this they will enhance by special haircuts and the like; in any case they will wear distinctive garments and behave in a distinctive fashion. Walking through the bazaar you have no trouble identifying everyone you meet, once you have learned the sets of symbols. These people want to be identified. If you know who they are, you will know what to expect of them and how to deal with them, and human relations will operate smoothly in a crowded space. . . . Obviously the mosaic system is best suited for a civilization in which trades require a maximum of skill, taught from father to son, and a minimum of organizational complexity. (Coon, 1951, pp. 3, 151.)

Coon's interest is primarily in how the mosaic system is made to work in face-to-face contact situations. Such situations, when they involve members of different elements in the mosaic, are generally economic, that is, trade relationships. Economic, or subsistence, needs necessarily override temporarily in any given interaction the divisive pull of intergroup hatred and suspicion. They do, that is, if they are successful and complete transactions. Since most Middle East cities owe their very existence to the fact that they are long-standing trading centers, where members of every element in the mosaic have interacted more or less peacefully, it is clear that group enmities can be, and have been for a long time, overridden successfully. But they have not been obliterated; indeed, they maintain their vigor. The fact of the matter seems to be that they can be "forgotten," as it were, only on an individual basis, and temporarily, in the interest of a transitory need, of which successful trade is a prominent example.

David Aberle has come near the point at issue, viewing it as the problem of the "integration of sub-systems with diverse values, within the total social system" (1950, p. 496). In this connection, he points to the coexistence of Catholics,

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7: Gulick E-5 (1952) 1955 ME1 Lebanon ME1

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Protestants, and Jews in the United States, and says that toleration depends in part on the special position of each not being actual dominations in the eyes of the others (*ibid.*, p. 497). In other words, disparate values cannot be too disparate, if the groups are to interact at all. The individual's religious role, per se, must not exclude him from full participation in other nonreligious role systems (*ibid.*, p. 498). Applied to the Middle East, we may paraphrase Abercle in terms of Coon's analysis, by saying that the diverse sect affiliations of Middle Easterners do not prevent them from interacting successfully with each other in the nonreligious role system of the marketplace.

However, the phenomenon of intense in-group cohesion and out-group hostilities remains as one of paramount importance. We must still deal with a system in which a large number of individuals apparently approach their social relationships with an attitude which can be summed up by the following Lebanese village axiom: "I am against my brother; my brother and I are against my cousin; my cousin, my brother, and I are against the stranger" (Tannous, 1943b, p. 232).

ME S71 L S71

Prothro and Melikian, psychologists on the faculty of the American University of Beirut, have recently reported on a social distance test which they administered to one hundred and thirty students in the University. In the test, social distance was put in terms of attitudes toward sect and national groups, primarily. Their general conclusion is that social distances between groups are greater than in the United States, "but they reflect, a general reserve toward out-groups rather than an elaborate classificatory system" (Prothro and Melikian, 1952, pp. 10–11).

But if we are to analyze the in-group system of the Middle East, a classificatory device is precisely what we must have. For, with a multiplicity of loyalties and suspicions impinging upon the emotions of every average individual, there is excellent reason to inquire why (1) anarchy does not prevail in the Middle East, and (2) why the average individual is not torn by irreconcilable conflicts. The answer to the first question is that anarchy very frequently *has* prevailed in the Middle East or large sections of it. To answer the second question and to explain why anarchy does not *always* prevail in every part of the Middle East, we must put the mosaic, or in-group, system into a more theoretical frame of reference than we have done so far.

THE CONCEPT OF SPHERES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

ME 194 S71 G21

The following theoretical analysis of the complex social structure of the Middle East is based, in part, on the theory of "balanced antagonisms," and the associated theory of "group segmentation," which Evans-Pritchard developed in his study of the Nuer (1940).

Evans-Pritchard describes the overall social structure of the Sudanese Nuer society (a distinct cultural entity whose relations with its immediate neighbors are typically hostile) as an "acephalous kinship state" (1940, p. 181). The society is

The second type, or temporary emigration, refers to a unique phenomenon which has recently occurred in the village. With the development of modern means of communication, a relatively large number of people (89 men and 73 women, or about 13.5 per cent of the total population) now migrate to other parts of the country (chiefly Tripoli and Beirut) where they engage in business, hold jobs or go to schools for nine months of the year, and come back to live in Rishmiyeen during the summer.

Illustrative Extracts from Personal Letters

In the course of his study in the village, the writer was fortunate in being able to examine about 100 letters written by emigrants to their people back home. Usually, the village people destroy such letters, and the writer had not expected to find any left in the village. The letters studied cover almost the whole of the emigration period, 1890-1939. The items they contain give first hand information of what was happening to the emigrants and to the village organization under the influence of emigration. The following are illustrative extracts from these letters:

1. From M. E. Deeb to a distant relative, M. Y. Elias; on the way to Argentina, dated June 7th, 1897.

"... When we reached Kafarbata (village on way to Beirut) we stopped ... the spring. There we met K. Milky, ... sons and M. Habib, who were leaving for America too. ... At Beirut, we were betrayed by those

[illegible]

friends. . . . We were made to pay seven gold pounds and a half for the ticket, while they paid five or six each. Never mind! Providence will reward them with what they deserve. . . . Please let us know about the health of your children and their mother, and about our son Dmib and his mother. Also, let us know how was the olive crop and how was the [illegible] wall case settled. . . ." (Stone walls are used as fences between pieces of land property, and have often been the cause of minor disputes in the village).

2. Same as above; dated March 24th, 1909.

". . . As regards L. Milky, he has sent me two letters so far, asking for the amount I owe him. I wonder what has happened to the man! Is he in such a great need, or is he afraid that I shall not pay him back the amount? Please do your best to settle the affair, and I shall send you the money soon. . . . Business is bad in this country at present, and I have opened a new store which needs all of my cash money. . . . Dear brother, please tell me about the house and our land property, also let me know what happened to the fig tree which I planted near the fence wall. . . ."

3. From M. Sarkis to his mother: Cleveland, Ohio, Nov. 29th, 1908.

". . . Tell me how much it has cost you to plant the new orchard, and I shall send you the amount. . . . Is it true that my brother wants to sell his share of the land? If so, let me know how much is the amount, and I shall send it to you; then you will

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186 transfer his share to my name. . . .
Tell me the truth about the whole situation and stop writing each time differently. . . ."

4. From above mother to her son; Dated Dec. 1st, 1902.

" . . . May God grant you health and happiness, with your two sisters, of whom I think day and night. So far I have received from you 16 pounds, then 14 pounds and lately 6 pounds. . . . Tell your sister Deeheh that her children are doing very well. I have sent her a small bunch of the hair of each child. My only request from you, my son, is to take care of your two sisters and be generous in sending us enough money; May God bless you. We have bought for you the olive orchard. If you have an extra amount now, send it, and we shall buy more land for you. . . ."

5. From M. E. Deeb to M. Y. Elias, Santiago, Argentina; dated July 25th, 1903.

" . . . The anxiety you express about your son Selim has disturbed me a great deal. . . . Please be sure that he is working with me in the store as a son and not as a servant, as you say you were told by some of our people. These are people of gossip and jealousy, who want to sow the seeds of dispute between us. . . . In the name of the love and friendship between us, I assure you that I love your son Selim more than my own children. . . . The coming long years will prove this to you, and God will reveal the truth. . . ."

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6. From Y. M. Elias to his father:

B:Tannous C,1-5 (no date) 1942
ME1 Lebanon ME1

Santiago, Argentina; dated Oct. 22nd, 1904. 621/186 •

". . . I have previously written you that my aunt wants me to marry her daughter, Miriana. I see that this is a good match. She is nice and well educated, and I don't believe there is any better girl back in our village. But your consent is my primary concern, and I beg of you not to deny me this request, for Miriana is a gem . . ." [532]

7. From three sons to their father, N. B. Nejjar, back home; Burraga, Australia, dated Dec. 23rd, 1905. 621/186 573

". . . Two weeks ago, we sent you a check for 50 pounds. . . . Our dear father, we have to remark about the way you write to us, and that it should not be so. Your letters contain many statements in which you address us and praise us in such a way, as if we were the masters and you the follower. There is no need for this at all, and our financial success should not change the relationship between us. We are your sons and shall always be obedient to you and do all we can to serve you. . . . Write us as father and master, who orders his servants to do their duty towards him. . . ."

8. From M. Sayhis to his relative I. T. Elias; Cleveland, Ohio; dated March 20th, 1911.

". . . Please forgive the manner in which I wrote you last, doubting your honesty in handling money I sent you for my mother and the family. It was all the fault of my sister who sent me false news and made me write to you as I did. I know now that she was after her selfish

P6P(a)

B:Tammuz G,1-4 (no date) 1941
MI1 Lebanon MI1

friends. May God never bless such a sister. . . ."

9. From H. to his relative, I. T. Elias; Penna., August 6th, 1914.

". . . I have sent you a telegram to foreclose the land property of N. (a fellow emigrant). He has refused to pay me what he owes me or to give me a mortgage on his land in the village. Then he resorted to a mean and immoral trick. He instigated his wife to bring a case against me in the courts, accusing me of assulting her. He did that with the hope of getting much money out of me. . . . Don't pay much attention to the newspapers cuttings (referring to the case) that I understand some of our jealous and mean people here have sent to the village. In this country, all things, little and big, are written up in papers, and nobody pays much attention to them. . . . Later, N. discontinued the prosecution of the case and came over with some of my friends and begged my pardon. . . ."

10. From S. M. Habalbal (middle aged woman) to her relative, I. T. Elias, U. S. A., April 3rd, 1919.

". . . The news of my son's death has broken my heart and my life. I don't know what to think or say. He was my only child. I brought him up until he was married, and then prevented him from sailing to America, so I did not want to expose him to any danger. I sailed away in his place, and have been laboring for years to gather some money, on which his children could grow up comfortably. . . . He is gone now, and his child is the only one left for us. Please say

p64 (B)

attention to the child and his mother; give them all they need, until I come back. . . ."

11. From M. Y. Elias to his wife; Argentina, Feb. 2nd, 1920.

" . . . Within two months, our son Selim will leave for home, so as to get married in the village and bring back all of you with him. Come with him to this country which is our new home and which gives us honey and milk. . . . Bring with you the following: (1) three fig seedlings (2) two grapevine seedlings 3) one red and one white hawthorne seedling (4) hindiane seeds (5) some "Arak" (local drink) (6) some olive oil. . . . Forget all about our property in the village. Let our relatives take care of it. Upon your arrival here, you will see that we own as much land as the whole village of Bishmizzeen. . . ." (Subsequently, the whole family left, father, mother, three sons and three daughters.)

12. From S. Nejjar to her relative; Jezzo, Argentina, March 7th, 1920.

" . . . I shall send you enough money to buy back all the pieces of land that used to belong to my late husband. You know I am not making of this a business affair for profit. I am doing this only because I want to keep alive the memory of my husband and ancestors who used to own that land. I want our son to inherit the land. . . ."

The Village Organization In Shadow And New Adjustments Are Attempted

Analysis of the above mentioned tables, cases and letter extracts seem

536 621 On such occasion, a large crowd, from Hakeimeen and neighboring villages would attend. An admission was charged, but no regular fee was assigned. Each paid what his "generosity" allowed. Thus was one more example of how the village fitted a new form of behavior into its established followays. The income of the play was used for the school.

From the above description, it can be readily observed how play acting, centering in the village school, helped to bring about active village cooperation, a heightened consciousness of community identity, and an active inter-village association.

536 621 486 However, one must not neglect to mention a highly significant point, one more indication of what was going to happen to the village in its newly chosen trend. Not a single one of the plays that have been acted in the village had any relationship to village and farm life. The language used was always the higher literary form of Arabic, which had little connection with the local forms of expression. The theme of the play was either copied from Western novels or referred to old Biblical or historical events. Keeping in mind the transcendent influence of the plays, by playing upon the emotions of the village people and creating in them a dynamic for new modes of behavior, one can realize to what extent it was influential in carrying the people away from the village. It widened the horizon of village life, as did the school, emigration, and the silk industry, but the horizon was widened to an extent that was conducive to the destruction of the community integrity.

IV

877 1497 When the modern educational movement began in the country some fifty years ago, several educational systems appeared in the field and competed with each other in their effort to influence the people. These systems had a variety of cultural backgrounds—English, Russian, German, Italian, French, American, Turkish, and native. None of these systems had a purely educational character. Their educational message was combined either with religious, or political aims, or both.

In the course of time, each of these systems came to concentrate its influence upon one area of the country or one section of the population. In the case of Hakeimeen, as was indicated above, the American Protestant system has been the most

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IP: Tamuna 5, G-5 (ca. 1947-48)1949 MEI Lebanon MEI

other business activities with the West; modern technology and means of communication; and, finally, the rise of political consciousness, culminating recently in national emancipation.

Each of these factors for change has been potent, introducing far-reaching influences in the life of the people. The educational movement has brought a rate of literacy, estimated at 70 percent, which is unequalled in any other rural area of the Middle East. The rate is even higher for the more advanced mountain region considered separately from the coastal and urban areas of Lebanon. Here we find a school in practically every village, catering to the needs of both boys and girls. From the elementary schools, village youth has flowed in increasing numbers to high schools and colleges. As a result, the horizons of the village has been widened intellectually and economically, causing the farming folk to question their way of life and to seek greater opportunities in the outside world.

As mentioned before, Lebanese emigrants, mostly from the rural areas, left in relatively large numbers to the Americas and other parts of the world. Practically every farm-family unit has one or more of its members residing abroad. Through correspondence, the press, and literature, through clubs and societies, through visits back home, and by means of the substantial sums of money sent to their families, these emigrants have contributed heavily to the widening of the village horizons and to the changing of its pattern.

Perhaps the most potent factor for change in the village at present is its politico-national awakening. This factor carries with it great possibilities for rural development, as well as grave dangers for its way of life. National consciousness at present permeates rural life in Lebanon. At the same time, practically every village community has been actively reached by one or more of several political ideologies. Rural people have begun to identify themselves with greater national and international entities.

The village community of Lebanon is now going through a stage of rapid transition and difficult adjustments. Its traditional organization, with its institutional pillars of family, land, and religion, is being severely challenged. New ways of doing things

9: Denton M-5 (ca. 1861) 1862
EF6 Serbs EF6
Lebanon ME1
Druze ME6
Middle East—Turkish Period M 2

the palace. Near the residence of the Pasha stands the principal mosque of Belgrade. It is appropriated to the use of the soldiers of the garrison, but is in very bad repair, the plaster having peeled off in large masses from the body of the building, as well as from the minaret by its side. Internally, the whole building is as ruinous as on the outside. Close to the gate which leads into the square stands a tomb, which a former pasha erected to the memory of his daughter, who has the reputation of a saint amongst the Turks. The tomb itself stands in a small apartment with glazed windows; and half a dozen wreaths of flowers strewed on the floor or hanging over the tomb, carried the imagination back to Père la Chaise, and the jet-black immortelles of a French cemetery. Round this and a second quadrangle are barracks for the accommodation of about four thousand men, and in a low irregular building in the main square are, at this moment, confined three hundred and sixty Druse prisoners. Their numbers, however, are fast diminishing: a choultera fortress, a black hole almost as bad as that of Calcutta, and a sun at times hardly less powerful, are converting their sentence of imprisonment into one of death.

However strongly our sympathies are called forth for the suffering Christians of the Lebanon, I confess that the treatment which the Druse chieftains have received has always appeared a shocking instance of the capricious tyranny and injustice which are found throughout Turkey. These chieftains have but too faithfully complied with the traditions of their country and with the

9: Denton M-5 (ca. 1861) 1862
EF6 Serbs EF6 ●
Lebanon ME1
Druze ME6
Middle East-Turkish Area ME2

barbarous instigation of the Government, and it is hard that their fidelity should be rewarded with the cruel punishment which they are now suffering merely to enable that same Government to set itself right in the eyes of Christian Europe. Had it not been for the interference of England and France, it cannot be doubted but that the murder of the Maronite Christians would have been tacitly approved or even actually rewarded by the Porte; but the authorities which at first prompted and then connived at the massacre of the Christians, have been allowed to purge themselves by visiting the consequences of their sin upon the heads of the instruments of the wrong. Turkey is governed not by acts of parliament, nor even by the hatti-cherifs and firmans of the Porte, nor by treaties made with foreign powers, but by public opinion and the Koran; and so long as the Koran, which is the very foundation of all authority in Turkey, prescribes or encourages acts of outrage towards unbelievers, it is hard that obedience to its dictates should, in order to satisfy the Western powers, subject men to the cruel and continuous torture under which the Druse chieftains are at this moment groaning and dying.

The government of five of the six fortresses which have been reserved by treaty to the Turks, together with the diplomatic intercourse with the Servian authorities, is at present divided between two Pashas, one of whom, Achir Pasha, possesses the chief rank and authority, and resides in the palace within the fortress of Belgrade. To him is intrusted the conduct of the

Zb: Bourani B-E (1941) 1947 M1 Middle East
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The political parties of the country, like its other political institutions, try at least on the surface to be inter-sectarian. Their officials, committees and electoral candidates are usually drawn from a number of sects. Their programmes usually contain some reference to the need of an ideal of national unity to replace existing sectarian jealousies. Sometimes this is genuine, sometimes not. Parties which emphasize Lebanese independence are most often Maronite in inspiration and membership; parties of Arab unity are similarly (though to a less extent) Moslem.

Political Conceptions

In such circumstances it is inevitable that there should arise very varying conceptions of what Lebanon is and ought to be: to a limited degree the differences in ideas correspond to differences of religious confession. Roughly it is possible to distinguish five main views of Lebanon:

(i) There are some who regard Lebanon as an integral part of Arab Asia, with no essential social or political difference from other parts and no special mission or purpose. They want Lebanon to be wholly absorbed into a Syrian or Arab State, with no autonomy but special provisions for the personal status and religious education of the minorities, such as exist in other Arab regions.

(ii) Others admit that Lebanon's past history has given it a character of its own and created a gap between it and the other Arab regions. But they deny that the distinctive character of Lebanon confers upon it special duties or a mission; they regard the special characteristics as no more than historical relics which will disappear sooner or later. They are willing to grant a certain degree of Lebanese autonomy or even complete independence, but only as a temporary expedient, with the object of allaying the fears of the minorities and gradually persuading them to accept complete union with a Syrian or Arab state.

(iii) Others again regard Lebanon as primarily a place of refuge where persecuted minorities can live in peace. They want it therefore to be wholly separate from the hinterland, and do not care what form of government exists so long as it is strong enough to protect them.

(iv) Another idea is that of Lebanon as a Mediterranean Christian country: not the western edge of the Arabic Moslem world but the eastern edge of Western Christendom. It is in

20: Hourani 3-6 (1942) 1947 M: Middle East
Lebanon ME1

in no essential sense a part of the Arab world, but its people constitute a separate nation. It should therefore be an independent State with its face turned towards Europe.

(v) There are others who try to extract and combine the element of truth in all these views. They admit that Lebanon is an Arab country by character and by destiny; but they believe that its special traditions confer upon it a special destiny in the Arab world: as a centre of Arab Christian life, as a gateway to the West and as a place where adherents of different religions can meet on absolutely equal terms.

Speaking generally and with large reservations, one may say that the first idea is held mainly by Sunni Moslems; the second by Moslem Arab nationalists and those Christians who believe that a lay nationalism is possible and desirable; the third by members of all minorities, particularly among the older generation; the fourth mainly by Marxists and other Unionists; and the fifth by Christians who want to remain fully Christian while being fully Arab nationalists.

These differences of conception involve different points of view on various particular issues:

(i) The question of the frontiers of Lebanon. In general, those who regard Lebanon as a separate entity have wished to preserve the frontiers of 1920, since otherwise it would be even less defensible and economically self-supporting than at present. The adherents of the first two views on the contrary have wished to return to the frontiers of the old Sanjaq, possibly with the addition of Beirut.

(ii) Many of those who regard Lebanon as an independent country or as a refuge wish it to be under the protection of a Western Power which will take in it an interest which is more than political. For most of them that Western Power must be France, but there are others who would prefer Great Britain or the United States. Those who regard Lebanon as in any sense a part of the Arab world, however, consider such protection too dangerous both for Lebanon and for the Arab world to be permitted.

(iii) A great many of those for whom Lebanon is a separate country recognize nevertheless that she must have a close connexion with Syria and other Arabic-speaking countries; but they insist that it must be based upon formal equality. The other countries must recognize the independent existence of

St. Stewart S-6 (1943) 1947 M1 M)Mid East
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Lebanon, and then the way will be open for close relations, particularly in the economic sphere. As against this, those who hold either of the first two views look forward to a time when Lebanon will be a province, at most an autonomous province, of a Syrian or Arab State. The adherents of the fifth view, however, hope to see Lebanon a member-state of a Syrian or Arab federation, with the same status and freedom of action as other member-states.

Developments since 1941

From 1926, when the Lebanese Republic was established and its political machinery began to function, until 1941 there was no essential change in the structure of Lebanon. In 1936, it is true, a Franco-Lebanese Treaty was negotiated which provided for the complete independence of Lebanon after a number of years, but it was not ratified.

In 1941, soon after the occupation of the Levant States by Allied Forces, General Catroux proclaimed the independence of Lebanon in a document which stated, among other things, that the Government of Lebanon would guarantee equality of civil, religious and political rights among all its nationals without any distinction.

In 1943 the first steps were taken to carry out the policy of independence by the holding of elections for the Chamber. The composition and actions of the Chamber and of the Ministry which emanated from it showed that a considerable change had taken place in the ideas and positions of the different sects during the past few years.

(i) The greater part of the politically conscious Lebanese desire an extension of autonomy, and are no longer willing to tolerate as great a measure of foreign interference in their internal affairs as under the French Mandate.

(ii) There is an increasing number who wish to end the French connexion altogether. This group is composed of two sections: first, those who still want foreign protection but believe that France is no longer capable of giving it, and therefore look to Great Britain to replace her; secondly, those who repudiate the whole idea of protection and believe that the only security for the special position of Lebanon lies in the good will of the neighbouring countries.

(iii) Many Arab nationalists who formerly desired the reduction

were children of Lebanese emigrants to Africa. The school was staffed with a director, a prefect of discipline, two directors of studies of Arabic and French (all of these priests), and 70 men instructors, 12 women instructors, and some nuns. In addition there were 12 supervisors, all priests. The school is under the authority of the Maronite Archbishop of Beirut who appoints the principal and receives from him a written report on the school annually. It is self-supporting, the fees being sufficient normally to pay all expenses. Any additional expenses are paid, when and when, out of endowments of the Diocese of Beirut. The buildings belong to the diocese.

The College is well known for the equal care given to the teaching of Arabic and French. It has produced a large number of the leading men of Lebanon, among whom are writers, poets, journalists, and clergymen. Originally both a seminary and a college, it is now only a college for lay instruction, the seminary having been moved elsewhere. The authorities of the College have been among the leaders in the movement for the assertion of what has been called "Mediterranean culture" and have taken the lead in founding the Cultural League of Free Education. This is an association of private Lebanese secondary- and elementary-school principals and inspectors which has the following aims:

1. Intimate cooperation and participation with the government in propagating the spirit of independence and patriotism in the hearts of youth, and the realization of education inspired by the Lebanese spirit.
2. The maintenance of the separation between school and political orientation and respect for the national Lebanese ideal and its cultural superiority.
3. Maintenance of the freedom of educational method in private schools within the public program.

Table 31 shows the program of studies of the school beginning with the fourth primary year (*huitième*) as an illustration of the attempt to give more or less equal emphasis to Arabic and French.

It should be added that though the hours given to French are somewhat less than those given to Arabic, a number of subjects are taught in French. The Commission in its visit to the school was impressed by the fact that the general atmosphere seemed to be decidedly French. The school authorities spoke French among themselves and kept some of the records in French. English is begun in the fifth primary grade (*septième*).

The school has a literary society, physical-education society, a band group, and a choir of 150 voices which sings church and Lebanese music. Dramatic societies are also active, giving both Arabic and French plays.

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CHAPTER IV

LEBANON

Of all the Arab League countries, Lebanon was the most reluctant to take part in the recent outbreak of anti-Jewish persecution. It was also the first member-nation of the Arab League to restore normal conditions after the conclusion of the armistice with Israel and to abolish restrictions which had been imposed upon the Jews during the fighting.

Lebanon differs from the rest of the Arab countries in a number of ways. First, there is no Muslim majority. Its population is composed of a number of minority groups, none of which individually constitutes a clear majority. The Muslims, both Sunni and Shia, together number only about 667,000, against approximately 600,000 Christians (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Armenian, etc.) and 77,000 Druses. The latest census —held in 1948—gives the number of Jews as 6,201, a figure probably increased since then by the steady influx of Jews from Syria to something over 6,700.

A number of Christian Arabs in Lebanon have, it is true, played an important part in the revival of Arab nationalism, mostly in the field of literature. But that has not prevented the Christian community as a whole from regarding the movement with a certain feeling of uneasiness. Albert Hourani (*Syria and Lebanon*, Oxford, 1946, p.128) describes the uneasy relations between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon as follows:

> Arabism has not yet determined its relationship with Islam. Thus there is a tendency for many of the nationalists, although not the most thoughtful leaders, to regard members of the minorities as imperfect Arabs, because they are not Moslems; as for Moslems at all, usually there is a tendency among the minorities to be suspicious of nationalism as a movement for communal hegemony (Moslem somewhere).

Apart from the tendency of the greater part of the Arab nationalist movement to rely on Islam as a rallying cry, its generally anti-Western orientation has provided a further obstacle to whole-hearted support in the country. For no country in the Middle East has taken so easily to Western civilization as Lebanon.

The fact that so high a proportion of its inhabitants are Christians has always made it a specially fruitful field for Western educational missions. The French *Mission Laïque* and the American University in Beirut have both played an important part in raising the general level of education, and there is scarcely a middle-class family in

65: Leaflet S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
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Lebanon that has no relatives in the United States, France, or some other Western country.

Lebanon joined the Arab League, very hesitatingly, because it wanted the League's support in its campaign for complete independence from France.

Typical of Lebanese uncertainty in support of Arab nationalism is the fact that the Maronites, who number 320,000 and are the largest single group in the country, have never shown opposition to the Zionist Movement in Palestine. Both the Maronite Archbishop of Beirut, Mgr. Ignace Moubac, and the Maronite Patriarch have even, in the past, welcomed the progress and civilization which the Jews have brought to the Middle East.

The Lebanese Jewish community is mostly concentrated in the capital, Beirut, with a smaller number living in Tripoli in the north, and in Tyre and Sidon, in the south. They are as deeply rooted in the country as any other group, the first Jewish settlements dating back to biblical times. Like the Christian population, they have gladly accepted the influence of Western civilization. Most of them are bilingual in Arabic and French. For many years they have suffered no restrictions in either commerce or the liberal professions, and thus form a fair proportion of the middle class, some Jews holding high positions in the Government service. Jews are not confined to any special area, though most of the poorer Jews live in streets which, in former times, used to be a Jewish quarter.

As a member of the Arab League, Lebanon found itself willy-nilly forced to take part in the invasion of Israel. Once the fighting in Palestine had started, the Government was forced to apply security measures similar to those introduced in all countries of the Arab League.

All foreign Jews, including the students at the American University and the French college, were ordered to leave the country in January, 1948. When military operations started in May, 1948, about 200 political suspects were arrested. According to a Reuter message sent from Beirut at that time, however, they included only a few Jews.

The hysterical Jew-hating which then broke out throughout the Muslim Arab countries naturally affected also Lebanese Muslims. On May 17, an anti-Jewish demonstration assembled in the early hours and a mob, armed with bricks, incendiary bombs and whips, proceeded towards the Jewish quarter. The President of the Jewish community received a telephone call from the head of the Christian Arab community, suggesting the Jews should take steps to guard their houses.

When the mob reached the Jewish quarter, they were halted by guards who had been posted there by the Christian Arab community. At the request of the President of the Jewish community, the authorities sent armed troops, who prevented the rioters from entering the quarter.

among the Druzes of Jebel Druze are different from those among the Lebanese Christians. The growth of the Arab nationalist movement has also affected the problem of minorities. It is true that in principle Arab nationalism need not and indeed should not involve a problem of religious minorities. But there are several reasons why at the present day it does involve such a problem. The first reason is to be found in the immaturity of political thinking among the Arabs. Arabism, as the previous chapter made clear, has not yet determined its relationship with Islam; more generally, neither majority nor minorities have yet faced the problem of the connexion between religion and the State. Thus there is a tendency for many of the nationalists, although not their most thoughtful leaders, to regard members of the minorities as imperfect Arabs because they are heterodox Moslems or not Moslems at all; equally there is a tendency among the minorities to be suspicious of nationalism as a movement for unrestrained Sunni ascendancy. Among some of the Christian minorities there is a further tendency to regard the West as their spiritual home, to which they can belong in a way in which they could never belong to the Arabo-Islamic world to whose fringes they have so long clung.

The mutual suspicion has been increased in the last twenty-five years by the bad relations which have existed between the nationalists and the French authorities. In these years Arab nationalism has been largely a movement of opposition to France. Those whose nationalism is still coloured by religion drew from that an additional reason for supporting the Christians as being of the same religion as the French. But quite apart from religious prejudice, suspicion had inevitably been aroused by the long-standing attachment of certain of the Christian communities to France. Many of the nationalists believe that this attachment has been used by her as an instrument in a policy of dividing, weakening and in other ways opposing the nationalist movement. Those of the minorities who have been used unwittingly in this way they regard as obstacles to the achievement of their aspirations; those who have lent themselves willingly to it they regard as traitors to the national cause.

Even when members of minorities become Arab nationalists, as many of them do, they often wear their nationalism with a difference. It is not only that they tend to emphasize

H. Howard 5-4 (no date) 1946 MD1 Syria NO 1

points in the nationalist programme other than those which are emphasized by the Moslems; they also sometimes conceive of themselves as having a special duty to perform in the movement. For example, some of the Christian nationalists regard it as their task to mediate Western civilization to the Arabs. This sense of a special duty makes for difference, if not for opposition.

6

This much can be said of the whole of Syria and Lebanon. But if a more detailed analysis is to be attempted, Lebanon must be separated from Syria. While in Syria, and in the Levant States taken as a whole, the Sunni Moslems have an overwhelming preponderance, in Lebanon neither they nor any other community forms an absolute majority of the population, and the number of Christians of different sects is slightly greater than that of Moslems, orthodox and heterodox.

Inside Lebanon also a distinction must be made. As will be described later,[1] the Lebanese Republic of to-day was formed after the First World War, by the addition to the pre-war autonomous Sanjaq of Lebanon, which consisted mainly of Mount Lebanon itself, of certain towns and outlying districts. In the former, the population is almost entirely Christian (mainly Maronite) and Druze. The additions included the coastal towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Saida (Sidon) and Sur (Tyre), and the districts of the Biqa' in the east and Jebel Amil in the south. In the towns the population is largely Sunni Moslem, although there are also numerous Shi'is, Greek Catholics and Orthodox and Armenians (mainly in Beirut). In the Biqa' and Jebel Amil the Shi'i Moslems are predominant, but here again there are large Greek Orthodox and Catholic and other communities.

In Mount Lebanon the majority is Christian, but the Druze community is large and strong enough to have played at least an equal and sometimes a greater part in the history of the Mountain. Thus the sectarian composition of Mount Lebanon is very different from that of the rest of the Mandated Territories. To a great extent also its history has diverged from that of other parts of geographical Syria. This has given rise to a specific Lebanese tradition. It is a tradition of asylum: remnants of sects and tribes, driven for one reason or another

[1] See Chapter IX, p. 170.

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1946 MDI Syria Lebanon misc.

Again, there was the traditional attachment of the Maronites to France. This is dealt with elsewhere,[1] and its effects upon French sentiment are discussed. It had equally great effects upon Maronite sentiment. It affected the modern form of their political consciousness; it also gave them the assurance that Western Christendom had not forgotten them, and thus helped them to resist better than other Eastern Christian sects the temptations to despair and to Islamization to which their position laid them open. Some of them went so far as to adopt French as their native language; in Beirut to-day there are a number of interesting Lebanese Christian writers who use French as their medium of expression.

In the last few generations certain new factors have arisen to add their weight to that of tradition. The first of them is the rapid advance which the Lebanese have made in the assimilation of Western culture: Western schools were established earlier in Lebanon than in the interior of Syria, more Lebanese than Syrians emigrated to the New World, and Christians were in general more eager and able to understand the West and to become part of it than the Moslems. In many ways, although perhaps not in all, the Lebanese are the most Westernized of the Arabic-speaking peoples.

The growth of Arab nationalism has also affected Lebanese political thought. There were Lebanese, both Christians and Druzes, among the founders of the nationalist movement, and still are among its most enthusiastic supporters. But very many Lebanese, even those who favour Arab unity and independence in principle, cannot help doubting whether Lebanon will gain anything from becoming part of a larger unit, the other parts of which are less advanced. Others, while conscious of themselves as in some sense Arabs and Orientals, also believe that the Lebanese tradition, different from although not necessarily exclusive of the Arab tradition, is worth preserving.

In addition to these developments, the revival of Christian thought which was mentioned in Chapter IV has influenced certain elements among the Lebanese. It has led them to regard Lebanon not primarily as the western frontier of the Arab world but as the eastern frontier of Christendom; and to ask, as the first and most profound of the political questions which face them, what are the conditions which will make

[1] See Chapter VIII.

is possible for the Lebanese most fruitfully to perform their duty to Christendom.

Finally, the establishment of the French Mandate, and the tension which has existed between the mandatory authorities and the bulk of the population, have placed a number of difficult choices before those communities which have a special connexion with the French. Should they cling to the French connexion even at the cost of a deep estrangement from the rest of the population of Syria and Lebanon? Should they throw in their lot with their fellow-countrymen even at the cost of abandoning their connexion with France? Can a middle way be found between these two difficult paths?

7

Thought about these problems, at different levels of profundity, has led the inhabitants of the Mountain to a number of alternative conceptions of the nature of Lebanon. These conceptions are often expressed in the form of historical or ethnological answers to the question whether the Lebanese are or are not Arabs; for example, there is a school of thought which emphasizes their Phoenician origin. At the basis of them, however, there is something more than an assertion of fact; there is a view of the function which Lebanon should perform, an answer to the question what her relations should be with the West and with the Arabs.

There are some who do not regard Lebanon as possessing a special mission. For them the Lebanese are simply a branch of the Arab people, distinguished from the other branches by nothing of political significance; their destiny is indistinguishable from that of the Arab people as a whole. Others do not go quite so far. They admit that history and tradition give Lebanon a slightly different character from the other Arab regions; but they do not regard this difference as forming the basis of a special mission or destiny in the present. It is nothing but a relic of a past age, an obstacle to be overcome before the Lebanese can fulfil their true function, which in the view of this as of the first group is to become a full part of the Arab people.

A third group believes in a special function for Lebanon, but a restricted one. It is to continue to provide an asylum for those whose religious loyalties or racial origins make it difficult for them to live in neighbouring regions. This,

although a noble conception, is also a limited one: first because it can only be actualized under purported foreign protection or guarantee, since the hills and valleys of Lebanon are longer render her immune from interference; and secondly, because it offers to the communities who seek refuge in her no ideal except to be left alone and to live on the margin of history, and no common aim except that of defence.

A more positive conception is that of those Christians who realize that Lebanon's being largely Christian and her being more advanced than the surrounding countries impose upon her peculiar and positive duties. There are some who maintain that Lebanon should become fully a part of the Western Christian world and that she should not be politically or in any other way a part of the Arab world, although she must retain close and friendly relations with that world. For them the ideal in the political as in other spheres is that Lebanon should be self-sufficient, but if that is impossible they would wish her to be dependent upon a Christian European State rather than be part of a Moslem Arab State.

Finally there are some who wish Lebanon to remain Christian without at the same time ceasing to be Arab. The specific duty of the Lebanese is a duty at the same time to the Christian West and to the Arabs: it is to serve as a centre from which Christian and in general Western influences can radiate to Arab Asia. If they are to perform this duty, the Lebanese must form an integral part of the Arab world, politically as in other ways, but receive a special position and special treatment inside that world. They also need the help of some Western State or institution which will take in them an interest other than purely political and self-regarding, though they must avoid becoming the clients of a Western State in a way which will alienate them from the rest of the Arab people.

The differences between these five conceptions are not closely related with the differences between the sects. Roughly however, and with considerable reservations, it may be said that the first two views are held by many of the younger generation of the Druses and Greek Orthodox Christians, but by fewer of the Maronites; the third view by those, to whatever sect they belong, who are deeply suspicious of the Sunni Moslems and at the same time conscious of their own weakness. The fourth and fifth views are of course

held only by Christians; the fourth by many of the Maronites; the fifth by those who have been moved by the nationalist sentiment without trying to make it a substitute for religious belief.

Probably the majority of French missionaries and officials in the last generation have professed the third or fourth views: that is to say, they have regarded Arabism as primarily an Islamic movement in which the Christians can have no place, and thus they have tried to make Lebanon into a place where the Christians can at least be safe and can perhaps even build up a national life of their own. Their attitude is determined partly by religious belief, partly by a sense of France's historic obligations and partly by a certain conception of French interests. As for the third party to the question, the Arab nationalists in Syria and the other Arab countries, they believe that Lebanon is a part of the Arab world and are afraid of its being used as a centre for foreign intrigues against them; but the more reasonable and responsible of them recognize the peculiar traditions and needs of Lebanon and are prepared to make special provisions for them.

8

The problem of the Shi'is is in some ways similar to that of the Christians and Druzes of the Mountain, since it arises from distinct religious loyalties complicated by a separate tradition and memories of persecution. But there is also another complicating factor: the backwardness of the Shi'is in social organization and their low standard of living. Their first need is for a reformed social organization and improved economic conditions. Once this need has been satisfied, it is possible that their outlook and feeling will be near enough to that of the Sunnis to make special treatment unnecessary.

There is one community which possesses a special relation to all the rest. The Armenians, whether Gregorians, Catholics or Protestants, have two characteristics which distinguish them from the remainder of the population of Lebanon. First, they are not Arabic-speaking, but have their own language, culture and national consciousness. Secondly, they are mainly of recent settlement there. The majority established themselves in and around Beirut in consequence of the measures taken against them by the Turkish authorities

of the population. Several of these were possessed of a local predominance in some part of the Republic: the Maronites in the north, the Druzes in the south, the Sunnis in the coastal towns of Beirut, Tripoli and Saida, and the Shi'is in the Biqa' and the extreme south. The consequences which are likely to flow from such a situation are clear. The political life of the Republic was deeply affected by the struggle for equality or superiority between a number of communities, none of them so strong as to be able to dominate all the rest. Sectarian loyalties and sectarian jealousies thus continued and perhaps strengthened themselves. In addition, the domination of the spiritual leaders over the members of their communities was perpetuated; the Maronite Patriarch in particular wielded an incalculable influence over the political life of the country.

6

The importance of communal differences in Lebanon was recognized by the Mandate. Article 8 stated the necessity of guaranteeing the most complete liberty of conscience and worship; the equal treatment of all inhabitants irrespective of differences of race, religion and language; and the right of communities to maintain their own schools. Article 6 required the Mandatory Power to respect the personal status and religious interests of the different sections of the population. These guarantees were reaffirmed in the Lebanese Constitution, promulgated in 1926, Article 9 of which declared: "Liberty of conscience is absolute. In rendering homage to the Most High, the State respects all confessions and guarantees and protects the free exercise of them, on condition that no harm is done to public order. It guarantees equally to populations belonging to every rite respect for their personal status and their religious interests."

These guarantees were respected by the Mandatory Power to a considerable extent. For example, the traditional jurisdictions of the communal courts were maintained in some matters of personal status, although a large proportion of such matters were transferred to the civil courts. An attempt was made in 1936 to define the whole position of the communal jurisdictions. The High Commissioner issued a decree in which the historic communities were given explicit legal recognition. Their statutes were given the force of law, and

It is doubtful if the system could have worked even as well as it did had it not been for the control and intervention of the Mandatory Power. But this again was a source of trouble. The French authorities were believed to be not altogether impartial in their efforts to hold the balance, and to show excessive favour to the Maronites and other Uniats. Thus the other communities became hostile both to France and to the Maronites. This hostility in its turn cemented the alliance between the two.

The situation just described had the approval of the majority of the Maronites, who chiefly profited by it. Many of the religious and secular notables of the other communities also did not disapprove of the conception of a Lebanon based upon sectarianism, either because they derived advantage from it or else because they could not conceive of any loyalty except that to the religious community. But the more thoughtful members of both the Maronite and the other sects, and especially the younger of them, saw the need for the creation of some sort of corporate consciousness or sense of solidarity. In the history of the years before 1914 this had to some extent existed; it had been based upon a common way of life and a common tradition of autonomy which all alike had valued. In the new Republic this was lacking and would have to be created. On the question of what form it should take, different opinions were held, corresponding in the main to the different conceptions of Lebanon expounded in Chapter VII. Those who regarded Lebanon as an asylum for religious minorities, together with those who regarded the Lebanese as a distinct people, wished to create a specific Lebanese nationalist spirit transcending communal differences; and they wanted the enlarged Lebanon to be an independent state, protected by or in alliance with a European Power who would take an interest in it which was other than purely political. Those who looked upon Lebanon as a point from which Christian and Western influences could radiate throughout the Arab East, wished to encourage the consciousness of Lebanon as both a distinctive unity and part of a larger unity; for them, Lebanese autonomism and Arab or Syrian nationalism were not opposed to each other but complementary, and they desired to see Lebanon, with or without the restoration of its

Neither more restricted frontiers, a self-governing member of a Syrian or an Arab federation. Those who considered Lebanon as simply one Arab province among others wished to stimulate Arab nationalist sentiments among its inhabitants and advocated its integral incorporation in a Syrian or Arab State, with only such administrative privileges as its distinctive history made necessary.

This last conception was particularly strong among the Sunni Moslems of the coast towns, most of whom clamoured either for the inclusion of Lebanon in Syria or at least for its reduction to the frontiers it had possessed before 1914. Some of them desired this because as Moslems they resented living in a State which had a mainly Christian atmosphere; others because they were totally opposed to the Lebanese particularist idea. Yet others, while conceding the claims of the Christians, Druzes and Shi'is to special treatment, did not agree that the coastal towns had any part in the natural or historical unity of Lebanon. This sentiment was strongest in Tripoli, with an almost wholly Moslem population. It was shared by the greater part of the Arab nationalists in the State of Syria. They were willing to accept a certain carefully defined autonomy for the historic Lebanon, provided its ruling would co-operate with the Syrians in matters of common interest. They bitterly resented, however, the inclusion in Lebanon of the coastal towns, especially of Tripoli, partly on grounds of principle because they interpreted it as a move in the supposed French game of dividing and weakening the Arabs, and partly because they did not like to see Tripoli and Beirut, two of the natural ports of Damascus, in any hands except their own.

For the most part these differences of opinion did not embody themselves in organised parties. The parties which dominated elections and the life of the Chambers were scarcely more than loose alliances of prominent politicians, based upon common personal interest rather than common doctrine. They were usually so organised as to include representatives of all the leading sects. The most important of them were the "Unionist" group led by Emile Edde, and the "Constitutionalists", of whom the leading member was Bishara al-Khuri. The main division between these two groups was the personal rivalry of their leaders; but on the whole the former was more intransigent in its belief in Lebanese

(b) The "[illegible]" [illegible] which was in French hands, the internal security. It had always been in French hands although in principle the local police and gendarmerie were under the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

(c) The control of the Bedouin.

(d) The censorship of the press, which was in French hands, although there was also a British military censor. (Shortly after the accession of the new Syrian and Lebanese Governments to power, they set up their own political censorships, which did not, however, replace that of the French, but were additional to it.)

Thirdly, in addition to these legislative and administrative limitations, there were various restrictions even on those powers which the Governments possessed:

(i) Their freedom of action was restricted by the great influence of the administrative and technical "*conseillers*", who, although officials of the Governments and in theory subordinate to the Ministers whom they advised, were in practice almost all-powerful in the departments to which they were attached.

(ii) Another restriction arose from the existence of the officers of the "*Services Spéciaux*" who were scattered throughout the country. In theory they were the Delegate-General's intelligence officers, but in practice they had always exercised a virtually unlimited authority in their regions: an authority which they had enforced where necessary by means of the "*Garde Mobile*", a semi-military police force which they had at their disposal. Among other things, the control of the frontiers was in their hands.

The nationalists had always demanded the recognition of the two Parliaments as the sole source of legislation; the transfer of the Common Interests and other similar services to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments; the abolition of the "Services Spéciaux" officers and a curtailment in the powers of the "*conseillers*". It was clear that these demands would be pressed with vigour by the new Nationalist Governments, partly because of the principles involved but also because of concrete advantages to be gained from them. For example, control of the customs would give them power to regulate fiscal policy and thus indirectly to assist industry and trade, and would place in their hands an important source of

powers. Control of concessionary companies would give them authority over the railway administration, the ports, the water and electricity companies and the tobacco monopoly, all of them in the hands of French companies and between them covering an important section of the country's economic life. The transfer of the "Troupes Spéciales" would make possible the creation of Syrian and Lebanese Armies.

Faced with these demands the Comité Français de la Libération Nationale (C.F.L.N.) defined its attitude sharply. In the first place, it claimed that it had inherited the Mandate from the French Republic; the Mandate conferred upon France certain obligations which neither she nor the Syrians and Lebanese were entitled to repudiate; they could only be ended or modified by the League of Nations or whatever organization might replace it. No definitive change of a radical kind could therefore be made until the League were revived or a successor to it established.

Secondly, the Committee, while admitting the possibility of a transfer of powers, sought to make it conditional on the willingness of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to conclude with them Treaties guaranteeing on the one hand the independence of the two States and on the other the special position and interests of France. The declarations of independence had foreshadowed the conclusion of such Treaties: and it was therefore claimed that the grant of independence had been conditional upon it.

Subsequently, under the pressure of events, the Committee admitted the right of the two Governments to demand immediate legislative and administrative concessions, but emphasized that the transfer of powers should take place in a correct way. In view of the importance of the issues involved, it should only take place after negotiation and agreement with the representatives of France. Any attempt to modify the present situation by unilateral action, without such formal agreement, could only be regarded as a deliberate insult to France.

To each of these theses the Syrians and Lebanese had an answer. To the first, they replied that they had never recognized the Mandate, which had been imposed upon them against their will and without their consent being asked.

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French troops, and to the death or injury of a number of civilians. The two Ministers who had not been arrested, together with a majority of the Deputies, continued to assert their authority from a mountain retreat and began to organize an armed force.

During these critical days the Lebanese people displayed admirable unity. The national cause took precedence over dangerous sectarian conflicts, and very few even among the Moslems dissociated themselves from the united front. Edde failed to form a political cabinet, and was forced to envisage the expedient of a council of civil servants.

Nevertheless, the country remained outwardly calm. That the Lebanese did not resort to an armed rising was due in large part to the confidence of their leaders in the value of the diplomatic support which they received from the Governments of the independent Arab States, of the United States and of Great Britain. The British attitude was defined by Mr. Law in the House of Commons on November 23rd:

> "The interest of His Majesty's Government in this dispute is twofold. First of all, we have endorsed the promises of independence given to the Lebanese people by General Catroux in 1941. His Majesty's Government have followed with sympathy and interest the subsequent development of constitutional government in the Lebanon. Secondly, the Lebanon is of vital importance to the war effort both as an operational base and from the point of view of communications. Any threat of a breakdown of law and order is therefore of direct concern to His Majesty's Government."

Impressed by the gravity of the situation created by M. Helleu's drastic action, the C.F.L.N. sent General Catroux to take charge in Beirut. He arrived there on the 19th and, having examined the situation in all its aspects, recommended the reinstatement of the Lebanese President, the release of the imprisoned Ministers and the recall of M. Helleu. Acceptance of this programme was announced in Algiers on the 21st, and on the following day the Lebanese leaders returned to Beirut in triumph. It was at once apparent that the reinstatement of the Ministers, as well as of the President, was inevitable, and the French authorities agreed to this further concession. Furthermore, M. Chataigneau, who had provisionally taken M. Helleu's place as Delegate-General, cancelled the decrees

they thought fit; or in general to enter into any engagements which would place obstacles in the way of their closer association with their neighbours. Nor would they give a privileged position to any other Power. It was clear, however, that they would be willing to negotiate treaties of alliance and friendship with all the major Powers, France among them, and to take their full share in the task of guaranteeing international security, under the supervision of whatever international authority might be established. They would also be willing to recognize the position of French cultural and economic institutions functioning in the Levant States and to give guarantees for their freedom of action; for example, they would give assurances for the position of French concessionary companies and French schools, always provided that they confined themselves to their proper functions and did not use their freedom for political ends. They would also give guarantees to French officials and advisers in their service.

In the course of 1919, tentative discussions but not official negotiations took place with a view to clarifying the position of the two parties. They led, however, to no agreement between the two points of view, and at the end of 1919 the question of the treaty was no nearer settlement than it had been at the beginning.

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The great mass of Syrian political opinion was behind the Government in its attitude towards the Army and the Treaty; if it differed from the Government, it differed in being more intransigent still but inclined to endure delays or make concessions. It was clear that, should a clash come, the French authorities could not fall back upon their old expedient of installing a "moderate" ministry of puppets. The present governing group indeed was the most moderate that could be expected. It had already lost some of its popular support and had been severely criticized in the Chamber on account of its efforts to restrain the impatience of the people, and was only kept in power by the absence of any alternative and the personal ascendancy of the President.

In Lebanon, too, the attitude defined in the preceding section was held by the greater part of the Government and of the political public, but not so unanimously and unreservedly

as in Syria; and the external question of relations with France was complicated by various internal questions.

Before 1943, there had been a reasonably clear division of opinion in Lebanon. On the one side stood the Maronites and other Uniates, with a number of the other Christians and lukewarm Moslems; they were in favour of Lebanese independence within its present enlarged frontiers and under French protection. On the other side were the greater part of the Moslems and the non-Catholic Christians, and all Christians and Moslems alike, who held Arab nationalist views. They were opposed to Lebanese independence under French protection, and in general desired the reduction of Lebanon to its old frontiers and the replacement of independence by autonomy inside the Syrian State.

In November, 1943, the greater part of both groups united in opposition to France: the second group because they had always been opposed to French domination and the first because, while they had wanted French protection, they were not willing to be treated as mere tools and were sincerely attached to their independence. Their resistance was successful, and resulted in the gradual transfer of powers to the Lebanese Government and a partial withdrawal of French influence. (This process had already begun, but was accelerated by the November crisis.) This, in its turn, modified the internal political balance of Lebanon. So long as French influence had been paramount, it had been used in order to maintain the predominance of the Maronite and pro-French element. Now that French influence was diminishing however, this element could no longer retain its dominant position. The Maronites did not constitute a majority of the population, and even inside the Maronite community pro-French feeling was not as strong as it had been. The way was open for other groups to secure power in Lebanon.

This change in the internal situation itself led to further changes in political feeling. The more extreme of the Maronites and Lebanese separatists hoped for the restoration of French influence, and were now willing, if necessary, to accept a reduction in the size of Lebanon which would give it once more a large Christian majority. At the other extreme were some of the Moslems, who were now willing to accept the independence of Greater Lebanon for tactical reasons: either from personal interest or in the hope that in a few years' time, when their

greater natural increase had given the Moslems a majority in Lebanon, they would be able to destroy the independence of Lebanon and incorporate it in Syria.

Between these two extremes there was a more balanced and moderate group. Although many of its members had opposed the independence and enlargement of Lebanon in the past, they were now willing to accept Lebanese independence within its present frontiers, but only on two conditions: the first that Lebanon followed a policy of real independence and was not subservient to France or any other Power, and the second that she co-operated closely with the other Arab States. This group included both Moslems and Christians. Its policy was based upon a number of considerations. Some of the Christians wanted an independent Arab Lebanon as a centre of Arab Christian civilization, others because they no longer believed in the possibility of French or other foreign protection and wanted an alternative. Some of the Moslems advocated Lebanese independence inside an Arab union as a means of gradually reaching the Christians to forget their fears of Arab nationalism. Others again, both Christians and Moslems, hoped that Lebanon might play a special part in the Arab world, as a centre of Western civilization and lay nationalism.

The possibility of a stable Lebanon depended entirely on this moderate group. The success of this group, in its turn, depended on its discovering some basis of unity sufficient to neutralize the centrifugal force of sectarianism. The need for such unity led to an attempt to develop a specifically Lebanese Arab nationalism. It was also one of the causes, although by no means the only one, for the spread of Communism which was one of the features of the year in Lebanon, and also to a smaller extent in Syria.

None of these groups was fully organized or articulate, and the Lebanese political scene changed continuously and rapidly. One factor however remained stable: the majority of the population no longer wanted or believed in French protection, and any attempts by France to split Lebanon from Syria on the question of the treaty were bound to fail.

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The question of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese relations was complicated by its connexion with the question of Anglo-French relations in the Levant. Great Britain's policy